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This article derives from a plenary lecture at the Policy & Politics annual conference 
in Bristol in September 2013. It was intended more as a tour d’horizon than as a 
detailed exploration of one topic and has the corresponding strengths and 
weaknesses of this kind of plenary. It frames the analysis by listing some challenges 
to the state identified in the call for papers. It then asks a key question, unasked and 
unanswered in the CFP: what is the state? Without a clear account of the state and 
state power, it is hard to assess these challenges and consider possible solutions. 
Third, reflecting shifts in the political field in the 1980s and 1990s as well as growing 
interest in governance, governance failure, and metagovernance, it reinterprets state 
power in terms of ‘government and governance in the shadow of hierarchy’. Fourth, it 
identifies the reference point for recent concern with challenges to the state. This 
cannot be the state in general but must be related to the actually existing state forms 
in a given period in the world of states and to the new forms of inter-state relations 
and efforts at global governance. Fifth, thus prepared, it explores crises as a specific 
condensation of accumulating challenges that pose problems of crisis-management 
and, to the extent that established crisis-management routines fail, crises of crisis-
management. Sixth, building on the preceding discussion, it explores the meaning of 
crises of the state and politics. Seventh, current trends in the state are identified and 
related to the decline of liberal democracy. The article ends with reflections about the 
future of the state and governance and the challenges of responding to challenges. 
 
1. Challenges to the State 
 
The call for papers and the conference programme both mention unprecedented 
pressures on ‘the State’ due to, inter alia: (1) the volatility and uncertainty of global 
finance and institutions; (2) the reconfiguration of the global political economy; (3) 
the rise of civic unrest and heightened religious tensions; and (4) the risks posed by 
climate change and new technologies. This seems to imply that these pressures 
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originate outside the state rather than arising from, at least in part, state action or 
inaction. This in turn poses two key theoretical issues. It takes the state for granted 
as a distinct institution (or institutional ensemble) and the distinctiveness of state 
power vis-à-vis other modes of governance or governmental technologies. The CFP 
then identifies another set of challenges, namely, those involved in deciphering 
current changes in politics and policy. The changes mentioned include: (1) the 
challenges of post-crisis state management; (2) reframing the welfare state; (3) the 
blurring of public-private boundaries; (4) managing large scale public reforms; (5) the 
rescaling of state authority; and (6) managing rising public expectations and their 
implications for social justice. The link between the two sets of challenges is not 
immediately obvious. The third and fifth changes indicate a further challenge: to 
decipher shifts in the form of the polity and its demarcation from other institutional 
orders. We should not dwell on such issues as the CFP and conference programme 
genre have quite different functions from an academic text. They are usually written 
to attract contributions from a wide range of theoretical, empirical, and 
methodological perspectives, identify issues relevant to public debate as well as 
academic concerns, and establish the conference’s relevance to a wider audience, 
including the media. But it is still surprising, at least to an inveterate state theorist, 
that the status of the state as an institution or institutional ensemble is taken for 
granted. This provides my starting point before I address some of the other issues 
that have been posited, for whatever reason, as worthy of consideration. 
 
2. What is the state? 
 
A serious challenge for state theorists is to define the state as a theoretical object 
(Abrams 1988). This question has been posed many times from many perspectives 
in different periods and political contexts. Many critics suggest that the state is too 
abstract, vapid, or ungraspable to be a valid or worthwhile object of theoretical 
inquiry – but they then proceed in many cases to reintroduce the concept, if not the 
term itself, through the back door after ejecting it noisily through the front door (see 
Bartelson 2000). While much of my work builds on the critique of political economy 
and historical materialist state theory, for present purposes (and, indeed, many 
purposes) the best starting point for tackling this basic challenge is the juridico-
political tradition of general state theory (allgemeine Staatstheorie). 
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This tradition identifies three constitutive elements of the state: (1) a clearly 
demarcated core territory under the more or less uncontested and continuous control 
of the state apparatus; (2) a politically organized coercive, administrative, and 
symbolic apparatus endowed with both general and specific powers (variously 
described as Staatsgewalt, Staatsapparat, or Staatshoheit – state power, state 
apparatus, or state sovereignty respectively); and (3) a permanent or stable 
population on which the state’s political authority and decisions are regarded, at least 
by that apparatus, if not those subject to it, as binding (Staatsvolk). Similar ideas, 
without this juridico-political terminology, are found in several other approaches. In 
addition, while general state theory seems to highlight individual states, it is also 
concerned with the world of states (Staatenwelt) as regards both the conditions 
governing the recognition of state sovereignty and legitimate governments and the 
challenges posed domestically and/or externally by so-called failed, collapsed, 
shadow, or rogue states with weak authority within their respective territories. 
Another issue concerns the extra-territorial reach of ‘super-powers’ (most notably, 
after the Cold War, the USA) that overrides in various ways the internal and external 
rights of other states. This ‘three element’ approach already provides an initial 
benchmark for identifying challenges to the state and deciphering changes within it. 
 
Before proceeding to these challenges and changes, however, some cautions and 
clarifications would be helpful. First, territory should not be confused with the more 
generic notion of the terrestrial (which covers here the nexus of land, sea, and air). 
This is the variable, technologically conditioned, ‘raw material’ of territorialization 
considered as a specific political process and can become a crucial stake in 
geopolitical and geo-economic struggles. Moreover, as the CFP implies, climate 
change (among other terrestrial changes), can prove a challenge for state-building, 
state restructuring, and the general or more targeted reorientation of state policies. 
 
Second, sovereignty should not be equated solely with police powers and/or military 
force. A useful typology in this regard has been proposed by a German sociologist, 
Helmut Willke (1992). He distinguished four general means that can be deployed 
alone or in some permutation to underpin specific acts or exercises of state power. 
These are violence, law, money, and knowledge (Table 1). While the first three are 
intuitively plausible, the fourth merits some explanation. Knowledge has been an 
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important aspect of state power for millennia and involves many forms of information 
gathering, political calculation, and surveillance (e.g., Scott 1998). Indeed ‘statistics’ 
initially referred to the collection by states of population and economic data for its 
 





Claim to monopoly of organized coercion in given territorial 
area to secure frontiers and create conditions for peace 





Create constitution, establish conditions for peaceful transfer 
of executive authority, institute property rights, gradual 





Consolidate bourgeois tax state with state revenues based 
on compulsory general taxation for legitimate purposes (and 
as basis for repaying loans) and use control over expanding 







State seeks relative monopoly of organized intelligence 
(information, knowledge, expertise) as basis for its powers of 
guidance (governance and meta-governance, e.g., the  open 
method of coordination) and for the surveillance of the 
population and other social forces within (and beyond) the 
state’s frontiers  
 
Table 1. Helmut Willke on State Resources (based on Willke 1992) 
 
own state purposes. The more general power/knowledge link has been investigated 
in many studies, including, famously, by Foucault (1980). As I note below, 
knowledge is gaining a bigger role in response to current challenges to the state. 
 
Third, the state apparatus is highly varied and I return to this shortly at greater length 
because it is so central to the concerns of the conference. Tim Mitchell provides an 
interesting gloss on the taken-for-grantedness of the state when he writes: 
 
‘[t]he state should be addressed as an effect of detailed processes of spatial 
organization, temporal arrangement, functional specification, and supervision 
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and surveillance, which create the appearance of a world fundamentally 
divided into state and society. The essence of modern politics is not policies 
formed on one side of this division being applied to or shaped by the other, 
but the producing and reproducing of this line of difference' (1991: 95). 
 
More generally, while some political scientists may be content with a de facto or de 
jure focus on the ‘internal state’, scholars of international law and international 
relations also examine its external dimension. As recent work on the global economy 
and global governance indicates and the CFP reiterates, state sovereignty is being 
challenged externally as well as internally. This is associated with the ‘rescaling of 
state authority’ as well as the ‘blurring of public-private boundaries’ as powers that 
were previously exercised by national sovereign states are now delegated 
downwards, moved sideways to cross-border arrangements, pooled or, again, 
transferred upwards to supranational institutions (cf. Doehring 2004; Jessop 2002). 
 
Fourth, population is not just the aggregate of the individuals residing in or passing 
through a state’s territory but is construed, constituted, and governed as a more or 
less complex object of state policy that varies across historical periods, types of 
state, and political regimes. The state apparatus has obvious interests in how its 
territory is populated and in the quantity and quality of its population. Among relevant 
variables are birth and death rates, age, sex, dependency ratios, health, military 
potential, skills and qualifications, and so on. It is an ‘object with a distinct rationality 
and intrinsic dynamics that can be made the target of a specific kind of direct 
intervention’ (Thompson 2012: 42). There is an extensive literature on the 
development of population as an object of governance, a process that involves ‘the 
creation of new orders of knowledge, new objects of intervention, new forms of 
subjectivity and … new state forms’ (Curtis 2002: 507). As Foucault noted, this has 
two main dimensions: anatomo-politics and bio-politics, that is, efforts to discipline 
individual bodies and to govern populations respectively (2008a, 2008b). We should 
also note that the population governed by states is subject to nationalizing, 
gendering, ‘racializing’, and other identity-based divisions; and that this is associated 
with different patterns of inclusion and exclusion both within and at a state’s borders. 
 
It is now time to integrate these themes into a general approach. Table 2 identifies 
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the defining features of the three basic components identified in general state theory, 
notes their external dimensions, links them to three basic dimensions or aspects of 
state crisis (to be explored later), and, additionally, to three modalities of ‘state 
failure’. It provides a general orientation to the state and potential external or internal 
challenges thereto. This said, it is important to note that there is no state in general. 
It follows that there can be no challenge to the state in general. Different forms of 
state rest on different forms of territorialization, are associated with different forms of 
state apparatus, and have different kinds of population. In addition, major forms of 
political power today are non-territorial in character and this trend can be related to 
some of the challenges confronting the state and state power today. 
 
On this basis, I suggest the following definition of the state to orient later discussion: 
 
The core of the state apparatus comprises a relatively unified ensemble of 
socially embedded, socially regularized, and strategically selective institutions 
and organizations (Staatsgewalt) whose socially accepted function is to 
define and enforce collectively binding decisions on the members of a society 
(Staatsvolk) in a given territorial area (Staatsgebiet) in the name of the 
common interest or general will of an imagined political community identified 
with that territory (Staatsidee) (cf. Jessop 1990: 341; on the concept of 
‘imagined community’ and its constitutive roles in the rise of nationalism and 
nation-state formation, see Anderson 2006). 
 
Building on this definition, I identify six aspects of the state – three more formal in 
character, three substantive. The first three refer to what systems theorists might call 
inputs, withinputs, and outputs; and the second three refer to some discursive and 
social features that give the state a specific content and, perhaps, endow it with a 
certain coherence (see Table 3). This provides one way to go beyond a generic 
analysis of the state or state power to consider the specificities of particular regimes 
and, in addition, the specificities of substantive policy fields (noting how they are 
constituted discursively and socially as well as through particular technologies of 
policy-making and implementation) and their associated forms of government and 








subject to control by 
state authority 
Special staff with 
division of labour and 
specific state capacities. 















Loss of state capacity, 







Loss of territorial 
sovereignty 
Administrative failure, 
loss of legitimacy 
Forcible removal, 
genocide, civil war, dual 
power, or divided 
loyalties. 
 
Table 2: The Three Element Approach to the State 
 
 
are by no exhaustive, witness the discussion of fisco-financial crisis below as well as 
the possibilities of a wide-ranging ‘organic crisis’ affecting the state in its integral 
sense) are (1) the breakdown of established channels of representation; (2) a loss of 
coherence as the state breaks into competing branches, departments, and tiers; (3) 
a loss of effectiveness of past and present modes of intervention; (4) a crisis in the 
social bases of the state, reflected in the disunity of the power bloc and/or in the 
decomposition of the institutionalized compromise that underpinned state power; (5) 
the loss of legitimacy, perhaps because the state fails in some undertaking on which 
it had staked its reputation, such as a war or the promise of economic prosperity; 
and (6) a crisis of hegemony (on the first, fourth, and sixth, see Gramsci 1975; on the 
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Three formal dimensions 
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Representation 
These give social 
forces access to state 
apparatus and power 
Unequal access to state 
Unequal ability to resist at 
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Three substantive dimensions 




Uneven distribution of 
material and symbolic 
concessions to 
‘population’ to secure 
support for state, state 
projects, specific policy 
sets, and hegemonic 
visions  
Crisis of power 
bloc 
Disaffection with 
parties and state 
State Project 
Secures apparatus 
unity of state and its 
capacity to act 
Overcomes improbability 
of unified state system by 
giving orientation to state 




Defines nature and 
purposes of state for 
wider social formation 
Provides legitimacy for 
state, defined in terms of 
its contribution to the 










3. Government and governance 
 
The three substantive aspects take us beyond the three formal components of the 
state to the mysteries of state power. Gramsci provides interesting insights here 
thanks to his greater interest in the modalities of state power than the state’s formal 
juridico-political features. He explored the modern state in its integral sense (lo stato 
integrale), which he defined as ‘political society + civil society’; moreover, in this 
context, he suggested that, with the rise of mass politics in political society and civil 
society alike, state power in relatively stable bourgeois democratic societies rests on 
‘hegemony armoured by coercion’ (Gramsci 1971). He explored hegemony (or 
political, intellectual and moral leadership) and organized force (including 
paramilitary and military operations) primarily in terms of their relevance to class 
domination. The same concerns pervaded his analyses of intermediate modalities of 
governance, such as absorption of the leaders of subaltern organizations and 
movements, piecemeal reforms to pre-empt revolution, and fraud-corruption. These 
limitations can be overcome by rephrasing Gramsci’s aphoristic propositions in more 
contemporary terms that have wider political and policy relevance in ‘normal’1 states 
as follows: the state in its integral sense comprises ‘government + governance in the 
shadow of hierarchy’. This acknowledges that the exercise of state power: (1) 
extends beyond imperative coordination and positive law to include the mobilization 
and allocation of money and credit and the gathering and strategic use of 
intelligence, statistics, and other kinds of knowledge (Willke 1992; Foucault 2008a, 
2008b; Miller and Rose 2008); (2) depends on the capacity to mobilize active 
consent or passive compliance from forces situated and/or operating beyond the 
state in its narrow juridico-political sense; and (3) includes meta-governance or 
collibration, that is, the strategic rebalancing of modes of government and 
governance to improve the effectiveness of indirect as well as direct state 
intervention, including the exercise of power at a distance from the state (Dunsire 
1997; Jessop 2002; Meuleman 2008). Introduced by Scharpf (1993), the term 
‘shadow of hierarchy’ is another way to refer to the state’s capacity to engage in 
collibration (for further discussion of the term, including its relevance to weak or 
failed states, see Börzel and Risse 2010; Héritier and Rhodes 2011). For present 
purposes, the shadow of hierarchy denotes the indirect influence that states may 
exercise over other actors or forces in political and civil society through the real or 
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imagined threat of executive or legislative action that draws on the state’s unique 
capacities and powers, including the legitimate or illegitimate use of coercion. This is 
not a purely technical or technocratic process but, as with other aspects of state 
power, involves efforts to secure and/or rework a wider ‘unstable equilibrium of 
compromise’ organized around specific objects, techniques, and subjects of 
government and/or governance. 
 
Rephrased in these terms, Gramsci’s notion of the integral state retains its relevance 
to class analysis but can be extended to other aspects of the state and state power, 
enabling links to more mainstream forms of political and administrative analysis. The 
notion of government plus governance in the shadow of hierarchy can, for example, 
inform thinking about the polity, politics, and policy and assist in the disambiguation 
of notions such as politicization. First, the nature of the polity is shaped by the ‘lines 
of difference’ drawn between the state and its ‘constitutive outside’, whether this 
comprises an unmarked residuum external to the political sphere (e.g., state vs 
society, public vs private) or one or more marked spheres with their own institutional 
order, operational logics, subjects, and practices (e.g., the religious, economic, legal, 
educational, or scientific fields). This is more productive analytically than the notion 
of ‘political society + civil society’. Moreover, politicization, which, in this context, 
could usefully be designated politization, extends the frontiers of the polity 
(penetrating or colonizing the non-political sphere(s) and subordinating it/them to 
political factors, interests, values, and forces). In turn, depolitization rolls these 
frontiers back, and repolitization reintegrates depoliticized spheres into the political 
(Jessop 2014). These potentially alternating processes can occur for various 
reasons, be promoted by quite different forces, and affect the balance of forces in 
diverse ways. Their overall significance for politicization broadly considered 
nonetheless depends on how they are connected to changes in politics and policy. 
 
Second, politics refers to formally instituted, organized or informal practices that are 
directly oriented to, or otherwise shape, the exercise of state power. As such, it 
comprises inherently open-ended and typically heterogeneous political practices that 
are mediated through the state’s forms of representation, ‘withinputs’, and modes of 
intervention. The scope of politics depends on which issues are regarded by social 
forces and political actors as appropriate topics for state action and their capacities 
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to articulate these views in the political system. Still aiming to disambiguate 
politicization, we can refer to these processes as politicalization. This covers, inter 
alia: (1) the forms and stakes of normal and/or exceptional politics; (2) the 
thematization of issues as controversial, negotiable, or consensual; (3) the subjective 
identity as well as material and ideal interests of political agents; (4) their location 
within, on the margins of, or at a distance from the state’s institutional architecture; 
and (5) their positioning relative to the front- or back-stage of the political scene. This 
is where challenges like those noted in the CFP may become objects of political 
contestation as attempts occur to establish, deny, or reframe their relevance to the 
political field and changing policy agendas. These attempts may involve reorganizing 
the integral state in the shadow of hierarchy and, indeed, serve to enhance state 
power by exercising influence indirectly and/or at a distance from the state. 
 
Third, policy denotes the formation of specific policies, policy-making, policy-taking, 
and policy-implementation, including non-decisions and abstention from state action. 
Terms such as politicization, depoliticization, and repoliticization are deployed in this 
context too. Policy processes occur within a framework defined by polity and politics 
(and can transform it) but they are also constrained because ‘politics takes time’ and 
not all potential topics of policy can be discussed and acted upon. Some implications 
of this for ‘fast policy’ are noted below. To conclude this section, let us note that, as 
already indicated, the notion of depoliticization often conflates the analytically distinct 
processes of depolitization, depoliticalization, and state abstention from policy-
making and decision-making. These and cognate processes shape the efficacy of 
state power (government and governance in the shadow of hierarchy) in paradoxical 
ways by insulating the state from political pressures that might limit its ability to 
pursue state projects (for examples from central bank independence and economic 
crisis management, see Burnham 2001 and 2014; also Jessop 2014 and below). 
 
Capital and the State 
 
Much of the literature (and much political discourse) presupposes a separation 
between the economy and politics, the market and the state. From a critical political 
economy viewpoint, this is misleading – not because this separation is absent but 
because it is part of a bigger picture. It depends on the variable lines of demarcation 
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between the economy and politics and their structural and strategic significance. 
Structurally, this separation is the condition for trade in free markets and the rational 
organization of production and finance as well as the existence of a constitutional 
state based on the rule of law. This interdependence between market and state is 
one reason why Milton Friedman (1962) (among other advocates of capitalism) 
described himself as a liberal rather than an anarchist. Strategically, differential 
accumulation depends on the use of economic and extra-economic resources to 
create the conditions of profitable accumulation and/or to socialize losses. the forms 
and extent of separation between the profit-oriented, market-mediated aspect of 
accumulation and its crucial extra-economic supports in, inter alia, the legal and 
political system and, notwithstanding this variable institutional separation, by the 
continued reciprocal interdependence of ‘market’ and ‘state’ as complementary 
moments in the reproduction of the capital relation. In this sense, the state is never 
absent from the process of capital accumulation, whether in stability or crisis: even 
laissez-faire is a form of state intervention because it implicitly supports the outcome 
of market forces (cf. Gramsci 1975). The state not only provides general external 
conditions of production, allocates money, credit, and resources to different 
economic activities, and helps to frame and steer production, distribution, and trade; 
it is also involved in organizing and reorganizing class alliances among dominant 
class fractions and disorganizing subordinate classes and forces, whether through 
divide-and-rule tactics or through articulating a national-popular interest that 
transcends particular class interests (Gramsci 1975; Poulantzas 1978). 
 
The state qua tax-state has become prominent again. As Schumpeter once noted: 
 
Public finances are one of the best starting points for an investigation of 
society, especially though not exclusively of its political life. The full fruitfulness 
of this approach is seen particularly at those turning points, or better, epochs, 
during which existing forms begin to die off and to change into something new. 
This is true both of the causal significance of fiscal policy (insofar as fiscal 
events are an important element in the causation of all change) and of the 
symptomatic significance (insofar as everything that happens has its fiscal 




The capitalist type of state is a tax-state, i.e., it gets revenue from its general power 
to levy taxes on the activities and subjects of an essentially private economic order, 
and this depends on its monopoly of coercion and its ability to set the currency in 
which taxes are paid. State revenues derive from taxes or loans guaranteed by the 
power to levy taxes. This distinguishes the capitalist type of state from states that 
use their own productive property to generate resources for use or sale (whether 
through strategic resources, such as oil or gas, through state-owned productive 
property, or sovereign wealth funds) and from private economic agents, individual or 
corporate, who must earn money through their own economic activities or valorize 
their own property before they can obtain goods and services from the market. 
 
Only with the rise of the constitutional state based on the rule of law, which 
accompanied capitalist development in the West, were taxes transformed: (1) from: 
payments linked to precisely circumscribed tasks undertaken by the state into 
general contributions to state revenue spendable on any legitimate task; (2) from 
extraordinary, irregular, and overwhelmingly short-term imposts into regular and 
permanently levied taxes; and (3) from payments that the monarch had to secure  
through negotiation to payments that effectively became compulsory (cf. Krätke 
1984). Interestingly, this third feature is now in decline because transnational firms 
and banks as well as many wealthy households can now choose how to present 
their accounts for tax purposes and to ‘offshore’ wealth and income beyond the 
formal reach of local, national, or even supranational states. 
 
This last observation highlights another aspect of the separation, structural coupling, 
and co-evolution of the economy and politics: its potentially global character. At 
stake here is the tendential integration of the world market (Weltmarkt) alongside the 
continuing plurality of the world of states (Staatenwelt). This has significant 
consequences for accumulation on a world scale and for the territorial and temporal 
sovereignty of states. On the one hand, the world market is tendentially unified and 
integrated through the logic of profit-oriented, market-mediated competition based on 
trade, financial flows, and (capitalist) commodity production. It constitutes both the 
ultimate strategic horizon for individual capitals and groupings thereof in the 
competition for differential accumulation and the actually existing point of intersection 
of these capitals. The resulting interaction within a world market framework limits the 
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scope for success of any particular strategy and is one reason why states take great 
interest in the organization of the world market and the rules that govern it. On the 
other hand, we still find a 'motley diversity' of states that are often rivals, if not deadly 
enemies. These have quite varied sizes, resources, commitments and abilities to 
promote and govern accumulation, whether on the part of their respective domestic 
capitals operating at home and abroad and/or on the part of foreign or transnational 
capitals whose activities impinge on domestic economic and political interests. They 
no more exist in unchanging mutual isolation, however, than do local, regional, 
national or international markets. Plurinational blocs, strategic alliances, temporary 
coalitions, and so forth, oriented to geo-economic and/or geopolitical advantage, 
operate here and are likely to change along with the changing bases of competition 
and competitiveness. Thus the ‘reconfiguration of the global political economy’ at 
various scales derives from the interaction of the world market and world of states. 
 
This structural coupling and co-evolution can be related in part to Harvey’s contrast 
between the (strategic) logic of capital (in general) and the territorial (strategic) logic 
of particular states. While the former aims to reduce obstacles to the movement of 
capital in a space of flows, the latter aims to fix capital in place to maximize revenues 
for a particular local, regional, national, or larger territorial unit and/or mobilize state 
power to control territory for geo-political purposes. This creates a tension between 
(1) potentially mobile capital’s interests in reducing its place-dependency and/or 
liberating itself from temporal constraints and (2) state interests in fixing (allegedly 
beneficial) capital in its own territory and rendering capital's temporal horizons and 
rhythms compatible with statal and/or political routines and temporalities. Harvey 
adds that each logic generates contradictions that must be contained by the other, 
leading to a spiral movement as contradictions are displaced to and fro between 
them. This is reflected in different forms of uneven geographical development, 
geopolitical struggles, and imperialist politics and in different kinds of crisis. Thus, if 
the territorial logic blocks that of capital, economic crisis may result; if capitalist logic 
undermines territorial logic, there may be a political crisis (Harvey 2003: 140). 
 
4. The reference points for challenges 
 
As noted in the introduction, to talk meaningfully about challenges to the state, a 
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reference point must be specified. For most work in policy studies, political science, 
political economy, and governance studies that are concerned with the advanced 
economies and/or liberal democratic regimes, this referent has shifted in the last 40 
years or so from the post-war Keynesian welfare national state to the changing 
character of neo-liberal regimes and/or the pursuit of neo-liberal policies and, most 
recently, the symptoms of crisis in and/or of neo-liberalism. The ‘Keynesian welfare 
national state’ refers to the states that developed in the post-war circuits of North 
Atlantic Fordism – an accumulation regime characterized by a virtuous national or, in 
some cases, transatlantic circle of mass production and mass consumption. They 
sought to manage relatively closed national economies on behalf of their respective 
national populations in a world of national states (Jessop 2002). This state project 
was based on a class compromise between profit-producing (or industrial) capital 
and the organized working class. It was undermined by internationalization. This 
made it harder to continue treating the wage and social wage (welfare spending) as 
sources of domestic demand rather than as costs of international production; and 
treating money as a national currency controlled by national states rather than as a 
tradeable asset in world markets. 
 
At least two other kinds of national state that developed in this period have also 
provided benchmarks for discussion of challenges to the state: dependent states 
oriented to import-substitution industrialization; and developmental states oriented to 
catch-up competitiveness based on neo-mercantilist export-led growth. These types 
were also challenged in their own way (albeit at different times and with important 
national specificities) by the growing internationalization of economic relations, which 
has weakened national states’ capacities to use their extant powers and resources to 
deliver economic growth and to maintain, let alone extend, social welfare. 
 
An initial set of responses to these challenges was identified in the academic 
literature and lay discourse as: (1) the hollowing out of the national state, involving 
the transfer of powers upwards, downwards, and sideways; (2) a shift from 
government to governance, that is, from hierarchical command to reliance on 
networks and partnerships; and (3) a shift from a world of sovereign states to a 
global polity characterized by the internationalization of policy regimes and the 
increasing role of these regimes as sources of domestic policy. These trends were 
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often described in one-sidedly, however, to the neglect of counter-trends. The latter 
comprised: (1) efforts by national states to influence which powers were shifted and 
how they were applied in local and national contexts; (2) efforts to engage in meta-
governance or collibration, that is, to organize the conditions of self-organization; and 
(3) interstate struggles to shape international regimes and global governance and/or 
to control their local or national implementation (for elaboration, see Jessop 2002). 
 
More recently, the key challenges have been construed as bearing on the capacities 
of states that have undergone one or another form of neoliberalization. (1) neo-
liberal system transformation (e.g., post-socialist states, with shock therapy in 
Russia, the Baltic republics, and so on), (2) neo-liberal regime shifts (e.g., the USA, 
UK, New Zealand, Australia, Ireland, and Iceland), (3) neo-liberal policy adjustments 
(e.g., Rhenish and Scandinavian coordinated market economies with conservative or 
social democratic welfare regimes), and (4) neo-liberal structural adjustment 
programmes (e.g., developmental states and dependent economies oriented to 
import-substitution industrialization as well as, more recently, some Southern 
European economies such as Greece). Despite these significant differences in the 
forms of neoliberalism (each of which is marked by variegation), there are six 
common features of neo-liberalism that have different weights and sequencing 
depending on initial starting points. These six features comprise the ideal typical 
neo-liberal policy set: (1) liberalization, (2) deregulation, (3) privatization, (4) market 
proxies in the residual public sector, (5) internationalization, and (6) reductions in 
direct taxation. These different forms of neoliberalization and their common features 
are clearly related to the reframing and recalibration of the welfare state, the blurring 
of public-private boundaries, managing large-scale public reforms; and also clearly 
related, in the wake of the North Atlantic Financial Crisis (NAFC) and its uneven 
global contagion effects, to the volatility and uncertainty of global finance and 
institutions, redesign of the global political economy, and a diverse crises that affect 
individual states and the world of states. This explains the rise up the political 
agenda of challenges posed by crises, crisis-management, and post-crisis recovery. 
 
5. Crises, Crisis Construals, and Crises of Crisis-Management 
 
Crises are, as the cliché suggests, moments of danger and opportunity. As such, 
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they have both objective and subjective aspects. Objectively, they occur when a set 
of social relations (including their ties to the natural world) cannot be reproduced (‘go 
on’) in the old way. Subjectively, they are moments of indeterminacy, where decisive 
action can repair these relations, prompt piecemeal adaptation, or lead to radical 
innovation (cf. Debray 1973). When repair work or piecemeal adaptation fails, 
perhaps because incorrect crisis-management responses were tried or because the 
crisis is too deeply rooted in the logic of a system, the latter will also fail, leading to 
stagnation, political paralysis, or perhaps a new system. 
 
Crises can be seen as ‘accidental’ products of natural or ‘external’ forces (e.g., crop 
failure, tsunami, or invasion) or as resulting from the inherent crisis potentials and 
tendencies of specific social forms (e.g., capitalism, liberal democracy). In addition, 
crises, whether regarded as accidental or systemic, may take a familiar form for 
which crisis-management routines have already been developed and/or which can 
be solved quickly through trial-and-error experimentation that restores ‘business as 
usual’. These can be described as normal crises or crises in an organization, 
institutional order, functional system, or wider social order. Crises ‘of’ institutional 
orders, functional systems, or social orders are less common. They typically involve 
a crisis of crisis-management, indicating the inability to ‘go on in the old way’ in the 
face of challenges that require radical new approaches to crisis-management and 
resolution or, indeed, indicating deep-seated contradictions and crisis-tendencies 
that demand more radical transformation or, even, revolution (on crises of crisis-
management, see Offe 1984). The disorienting effects of crisis create the space for 
contesting previously sedimented meanings, which can occur in many different fields 
on many different scales. This can create in turn opportunities to reorder the lines of 
demarcation that distinguish the polity from its ‘constitutive outside’, to reshape the 
political field and reconfigure the state apparatus and bases of state power, and to 
redefine the legitimate themes and topics for policy debate, policy-making, and policy 
implementation. In short, crises are opportunities for political contestation and 
learning as well as policy learning. 
 
The lived experience of serious crises is always partial, limited to particular social 
segments of time-space. No-one experiences THE CRISIS. Thus construals of the 
overall dynamics of a crisis are heavily mediatized, that is, they depend on specific 
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forms of visualization and media representations. Different actors have different 
access to these accounts and their explicit or implicit crisis narratives; and the mass 
media often present very different accounts from those in specialized, insider media. 
Thus, whether considered as events or processes, crises prompt diverse construals 
as actors seek to: (1) make sense of the ‘crisis’ as it unfolds in space-time; (2) 
attribute (rightly or wrongly) ideological, institutional, technical, and personal (or 
organizational) blame; (3) establish whether this is a crisis ‘in’ or ‘of’ the relevant 
system(s), (4) chart alternative futures to prevent or guide them, and (5) recommend 
specific lines of action for particular forces over different time frames and spatial 
horizons. Construing a serious crisis is itself a challenging task because crises have 
many structural and conjunctural aspects and spatio-temporal complexities; and they 
affect social forces in quite varied ways. In short, it is hard to read crises. 
 
Securing consensus on a construal is nonetheless half the battle in setting the terms 
in which it might be resolved. But it is only half the battle. For this construal must be 
translated into coherent solutions that match the objective dimensions of the crisis 
and that can be implemented with appropriate resources and governmental 
technologies. Powerful narratives without powerful bases from which to implement 
them are less effective than more ‘arbitrary, rationalistic and willed’ accounts 
pursued by the powerful. Indeed, because power is, in key respects, the ability not to 
have to learn from one’s mistakes (Deutsch 1963: 111), leading social forces that 
played a key role in creating, precipitating, or prolonging a crisis may try to impose 
the costs of their mistakes onto others and to distort the learning process. 
 
Crisis construals frame the range of actions that occur in response to a crisis (for a 
well-known case study in political sociology, see Hay 1996; more generally, de 
Ruycker & Don 2013). While some constructivist theorists construe all construals as 
arbitrary, this extreme stance can be countered by distinguishing arbitrary, or 
conventional, [often linguistic] signs from natural signs, which are the visible 
symptoms of underlying ‘real world’ events or processes (Augustine of Hippo 389 
AD). Crises become visible through their symptoms but, because there is generally 
no one-to-one relation between symptom and cause, especially in serious crises, the 
symptoms need construing to establish their deeper causes as the basis for decisive 
interventions. As in the medical field, ‘symptomatology’ is based on trial-and-error 
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observation and construal that draws on past experience but may also require 
forgetting as basis for ‘correct’ intervention. 
 
In this context, construals can be assessed in terms of their scientific validity, which 
deals with the past and present; and/or in terms of their correctness, that is, the 
capacity to discern the transformative potentials in particular crisis conjunctures. 
Whether this potential is actualized depends on the actions taken within limits that 
are set by (1) the objective nature of the crisis conjuncture; (2) the interpretive and 
mobilizing power of strategic perspectives; (3) the balance of forces associated with 
different construals; and (4) whether certain kinds of construal can only be acted 
upon by certain institutions or actors, such as declaring a state of emergency. 
 
6. Economic and political crisis 
 
Economic crises are not per se decisive for politics and the state. Indeed, as 
indicated, ‘normal’ crises are often means to renew capital accumulation by purging 
inefficient capitals, removing disproportions, and re-imposing the unity of circuits of 
capital. But there is no invisible hand that guarantees the self-stabilization of profit-
oriented, market-mediated accumulation; nor can this occur through visible or 
invisible handshakes (or the use of an iron fist) in cases where political factors such 
as force, domination or close ties to the state contribute significantly to differential 
accumulation. Nor are there any technocratic guarantees of successful crisis-
management. This said, financial and economic crises have more radical effects 
when the state is the addressee in the first (or even last) instance of calls for crisis-
intervention and resolution and the state and politics are affected by crises that 
hinder or block effective crisis-management, leading to crises of crisis-management 
(on kinds of state and political crisis, see above and Poulantzas 1979). State and 
political crises may translate or displace economic crisis tendencies and symptoms 
into the political field and/or intensify both types of crisis. Even without extant political 
and state crisis-tendencies, an acute economic crisis or ‘economic emergency’ can 
weaken the ‘temporal sovereignty’ of the state apparatus (see below). This highlights 
the relevance of polity, politics and policy to crisis management and crisis recovery. 
 
The NAFC was not initially linked in the spaces in which it first visibly broke out to a 
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crisis in the state in its integral sense, that is, in ‘government + governance in the 
shadow of hierarchy’. Instead, ‘market failure’ led to ‘state rescue’ as too-big-to-fail 
banks were bailed out and measures taken to facilitate a superficial return to 
financial ‘business as usual’. It has taken far longer to secure a limited, halting 
recovery in the ‘real economy’ and, in some cases, this has still not occurred or has 
been achieved by stimulating fresh bubbles through quantitative easing (QE) and a 
virtually zero interest rate policy (ZIRP). Meanwhile the immediate rescue measures, 
QE, ZIRP (which rebuilds bank capital, boosts bank profits, supports renewed 
speculation, keeps government interests payments down, and enables financial 
repression), and generally half-hearted (but loudly proclaimed and fiercely 
condemned) austerity programmes have helped to transform a liquidity and financial 
crisis into a crisis of public finance and sovereign debt. This in turn have been 
invoked to justify a reinvigoration of neo-liberalism, the extension of neo-liberal 
structural adjustment programmes, and a pre-emptive tightening of surveillance and 
policing measures to weaken the ability of subaltern groups to protest and resist the 
new politics of austerity and welfare retrenchment. This is even more important to 
the extent that the apparent recovery, however uneven it remains within and across 
national and regional economies, remains fragile and there are serious doubts about 
how effectively the exit strategy from crisis-management measures can be finessed. 
 
7. From liberal democracy to post-democracy? 
 
There are sound formal and historical reasons to support the general claim of a 
partial correlation or isomorphic complementarity between the market economy and 
liberal democracy. There are also many examples of authoritarian and totalitarian 
regimes that have presided over capitalist development and/or emerged in economic 
and political crisis conjunctures in consolidated capitalist social formations. This has 
prompted regular concern with the conditions in which one or other kind of capitalism 
can co-exist with and/or sustain liberal democracy, and vice versa. Such concerns 
had already emerged during the growth of imperialism at the end of the nineteenth 
century and they were repeated in different forms in the declaration of states of 
emergency and suspension of normal parliamentary politics during the first and 
second world wars, the crisis of parliamentary regimes that accompanied the Great 
Depression, the crisis of Atlantic Fordism in the 1970s, and, most recently, still 
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referring to the advanced capitalist economies, the NAFC and the crisis in (and only 
rarely of) neo-liberal political regimes. 
 
A common trend in these states of military, political and economic emergency has 
been the strengthening of authoritarian statism. This involves ‘intensified state 
control over every sphere of socio-economic life combined with radical decline of 
institutions of political democracy and with draconian and multiform curtailment of so-
called “formal” liberties’ (Poulantzas 1978: 203-4). In its incarnation from the 1970s 
onwards, key features of authoritarian statism include: (1) the transfer of power from 
the legislative to executive branch and the growing concentration of power within the 
executive; (2) decline in the rule of law as conventionally understood plus greater 
resort to soft law, pre-emptive surveillance and policing, and emergency measures; 
(3) a transformation of political parties from transmission belts that represent public 
opinion to the administration and, relatedly, from major forces in organizing 
hegemony into vehicles for relaying state ideology and justifying policies to the 
population; (4) the rise of parallel power networks that cross-cut the formal 
organization of the state, involving links among industrial and financial elites, 
powerful lobby groups, politicians from the ‘natural’ governing parties, top 
bureaucrats, and media magnates, with a major share in shaping its activities,  
(Poulantzas 1978; Crouch 2004; Elsner 2013). 
 
While this can be seen as a secular trend, with reversals that never return politics to 
the status quo ante but have a ratchet-effect that means that the next authoritarian 
step starts from a higher point, security, economic, and political crises are important 
drivers of each new step. Accompanying these trends in the context of economic 
crises is the loss by states at different scales of temporal sovereignty. While the 
development of the world market and its associated space of flows is widely 
regarded as challenging the state’s territorial sovereignty, its temporal sovereignty is 
said to be challenged by the acceleration of time (Scheuerman 2003). States face 
growing temporal pressures in policy-making and implementation due to new forms 
of time-space distantiation, compression, and differentiation. For example, as the 
rhythms of the economy at different scales accelerate relative to those of states at 
different scales, state apparatuses have less time to determine and co-ordinate 
political responses to economic events, shocks, and crises – whether these 
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responses are formulated by a state or states, public-private partnerships, or 
international regimes. This reinforces conflicts between the time(s) of the market and 
the time(s) of state policy-making and implementation and, a fortiori, of inter-state 
coordination. One response has been withdrawal from areas where states are 
actually or allegedly too slow to make a difference or would become overloaded if 
they tried to keep pace. This laissez-faire response frees up the movement of 
superfast and/or hypermobile capital – increasing the chances of crises generated by 
relatively unregulated activities with potentially global contagion effects. 
 
A second option is to compress decision-making cycles through the shortening of 
policy development cycles, fast-tracking decision-making, and engaging in rapid 
policy implementation to enable more timely and appropriate interventions. But this 
means that decisions could be made on the basis of unreliable information, 
insufficient consultation, lack of participation, etc., even as state managers continue 
to believe that policy is taking too long to negotiate, formulate, enact, adjudicate, 
determine, and implement. This is especially marked in the face of (real or imagined) 
emergencies: contrast the financial crisis in 2008 with the more gradual, decade-long 
unfolding of the crisis in/of Fordism from the mid-1960s onwards. In general, this 
privileges those who can operate within compressed time scales at the expense of 
those with long decision-taking cycles, narrows the range of participants in the policy 
process, and limits the scope for deliberation, consultation, and negotiation. It 
thereby privileges the executive over the legislature and the judiciary, finance over 
industrial capital, consumption over long-term investment. It is also undermines the 
routines and cycles of democratic politics more generally. This is clear in the recent 
global financial crisis, where pressure to act forced states to rescue banks that were 
deemed ‘too big to fail’ and led to the concentration of decision-making power in the 
hands of a small financial elite who had played a key role in creating the crisis in the 
first instance. Interestingly, the limits to this approach are becoming apparent in 
hostility to fast track authority in the USA regarding the Trans-Pacific Partnership. 
 
A third option is not to compress absolute political time but to create relative political 
time by slowing the circuits of capital. A well-known recommendation here is a 
modest tax on financial transactions (the ‘Tobin tax’), which would decelerate the 
flow of superfast and hypermobile financial capital and limit its distorting impact on 
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the real economy. The continued success of financial capital in blocking the Tobin 
tax (most recently in the European Union) illustrates the limits of this strategy. 
 
8. Concluding remarks 
 
This wide-ranging tour d’horizon of themes and issues that were posed by the 
conference organizers and/or that follow from the conference agenda has outlined a 
theoretical approach that indicates possible connections among different ‘real world’ 
and theoretical challenges and suggests some guiding threads for research on 
politics and policy. Little time or space is now left for conclusions. I therefore restrict 
my concluding remarks to five basic propositions that are outlined above, could help 
to frame current debates, and would provide useful themes for future research. First, 
there are no global challenges that have uniform effects on the state in general: 
globalization is multiform, multiscalar, multi-temporal, and multicausal and different 
aspects have different effects with uneven consequences for the exercise of state 
power. Second, the ‘present state’ does not exist: there is a motley diversity of states 
whose diversity can be studied through a strategic-relational approach to state 
power, bearing in mind the distinction between polity, politics, and policy. Third, 
crises are objectively overdetermined, subjectively indeterminate and, for this 
reason, how crises are construed and translated into strategic action and policy has 
important path-shaping effects. Fourth, crises are normal events and process and, 
through time, social forces learn how to cope with them. So it is crises of crisis-
management that present the biggest challenges to politics and that are likely to 
have the biggest effects on the transformation of the polity, politics, and policy. Fifth, 
in the current period, we can observe a trend to a post-democratic, authoritarian 
statism, which seems to be accelerating. This represents a major challenge to 
political and civil society but is not inevitable. 
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Endnote 
1 ‘Normal’ refers here to the ideal-typical form of the modern state, i.e., a state based 
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